Abstract We classify and analyze bit errors in the current measurement mode of the Kirchhoff-lawJohnson-noise (KLJN) key distribution. The error probability decays exponentially with increasing bit exchange period and fixed bandwidth, which is similar to the error probability decay in the voltage measurement mode. We also analyze the combination of voltage and current modes for error removal. In this combination method, the error probability is still an exponential function that decays with the duration of the bit exchange period, but it has superior fidelity to the former schemes.
Introduction
Information theoretic security, often referred to as "unconditional security" [1] , means that the security measures are determined by information theory or, in physical systems, by measurement theory. These security measures can be perfect or imperfect and are determined by the eavesdropper's ("Eve's") supposed optimum conditions for extracting the maximum amount of information. In other words, Eve's information is calculated by assuming that she has unlimited computational power and that her measurement accuracy and measurement speed are limited only by the laws of physics and the protocol's conditions. Quantum key distribution (QKD) [2] was the first scheme based on the laws of physics that claimed to possess unconditional security. However, this claim is not uncontested and there is an ongoing debate [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] about the security inherent in existing QKD schemes. This discussion was initiated by quantum security experts Horace Yuen [3] [4] 7] and Osamu Hirota [5] , who agreed in their claim that the achievable level of security in QKD schemes is questionable. Renner [6] later entered this debate to defend the foundations of quantum cryptography and to validate existing security proofs.
From a practical point of view one observes that several communicators, including commercial and laboratory-type QKD devices, have been successfully cracked, as shown in numerous publications [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] . These demonstrated flaws of the QKD devices-and also some practical issues such as limited communication range and high price-have inspired new initiatives that involve non-QKD schemes utilizing alternative types of mechanisms to achieve security [23, 24] .
Recent studies have shown that a system employing two pairs of resistors, with Gaussian voltage noise generators to imitate and enhance their Johnson noise, can be used for secure key distribution [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] . This system is known as the Kirchhoff-lawJohnson-noise (KLJN) secure key distribution and provides information theoretic security [26, 27] . It is based on Kirchhoff's loop law of quasielectrodynamics and the fluctuation-dissipation theorem of statistical physics [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] . The KLJN scheme has potential applications including physical uncloneable function hardware keys [32] ; unconditional security within computers, hardware and other instruments [32, 33] ; and unconditionally secure smart grids [34] [35] [36] . Figure 1 shows the fundamental KLJN system [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] without defense elements against active (invasive) attacks and vulnerabilities represented by non-ideal building elements. Under practical conditions, this system utilizes enhanced Johnson noise with high noise temperature, obtained from Gaussian noises generated electronically so that quasi-static and thermodynamic characteristics are emulated as accurately as possible, in order to approach perfect security [31] . The core KLJN channel is represented by a wire line to which the two communicating parties, "Alice" and "Bob", connect their resistors A R and B R , respectively. These resistors are randomly selected from the set   01 , RR , with 01 RR  . The resistor 0 R indicates the low (0) bit and the resistor 1 R indicates the high (1) bit, respectively [25] . At the beginning of each clock period or bit exchange period, Alice and Bob, who have identical pairs of resistors, randomly choose one of these resistors and connect it to the wire line. The cases when Alice and Bob use the same resistance values-i.e., the 00 and 11 situationsrepresent non-secure bit exchange. Eve will then be able to find the resistor values, their location and the status of the bits, because the total resistance will either be the lowest or the highest value of the three possible magnitudes of the total resistance. The situations when Alice and Bob use the resistance values 01 and 10 signify a secure bit exchange event because these resistances cannot be distinguished by measured mean-square values. Alice and Bob will know that the other party has the inverse of his/her bit, which implies that a secure key exchange takes place.
The KLJN key distribution scheme has statistical errors due to the finite duration time  of the bitexchange period [30, 31] . Specifically, an experimental demonstration of the KLJN scheme, conducted recently by Mingesz et al. [30] , yielded that the fidelity of the KLJN key exchange was 99.98 %, corresponding to a bit error probability of 0.02 %.
The bit errors were analyzed recently by Saez and Kish [31] for the case of the mean square noise voltage being utilized for key exchange. The bit error probability showed exponential decay vs.  .
In the present paper we analyze the bit errors in the current measurement mode, and we also analyze the combination of voltage and current modes for error mitigation.
Bit interpretation of the measured channel current
We suppose ideal components/conditions and proceed as in earlier work [31] . Alice and Bob obtain Thresholds determine the boundaries between the different interpretations of the measured meansquare channel voltages [31] . In the present paper, we use threshold values  in a similar way below.
Error probabilities due to statistical inaccuracies in noise current measurements
Bit errors occur when the protocol makes incorrect bit interpretations due to statistical inaccuracies in the measured mean square noise current, and an error analysis for voltage-based operation was presented before [31] . There are different types of error situations, as shown in Table 1 . Similarly to the voltage-based case [31] , two types of errors need to be addressed for current-based measurements: the 11==>01/10 errors, i.e., errors when the actual situation 11 is interpreted as 01/10, and the 00==>01/10 errors when the actual situation 00 is interpreted as 01/10. The probabilities for these types of errors are estimated below in a similar way as before [31] . Figure 3 shows a block diagram for the measurement process at the 11 bit situation. The channel current first enters a squaring unit. For typical practical applications, the output signal is a voltage, because the squaring unit employs voltagesignal-based electronics. However, for the sake of simplicity and without loosing generality, we assume that the numerical values of the voltage correspond to the measured current. Thus we keep the current-based notation as if the electronics would be a current-based signal system. In other words, the voltages are calibrated so that the numerical values are the same as those of the current. The numerical value of this instantaneous amplitude is expressed as () it   . This probability can be evaluated from the error function, but such a procedure requires numerical integration. However, one can achieve an analytic solution by using Rice's formula [38, 39] According to previous work [31, 37] , and also as given in Fig. 4 Using Eqs. (7) and (9) 
It should be noted that this error probability is an exponential function of the parameters  and  , which is consistent with earlier results [31] . The dependence on  shows that the error probability decays exponentially with increasing bit exchange period  .
Probability of 00==>01/10 type errors in currentbased measurements
In order to compute this probability, we introduce  to define the threshold 4  as a fraction of the measured mean-square channel noise. Thus 2 4 00 ,00
where ,00 () i Sf is the channel noise spectrum at the 00 bit situation.
Following the same procedure as above, the probability ,00 i  of the 00==>01/10 type of errors is again found to be exponentially scaling according to 
Increasing the parameter  , and consequently 
, by a factor of two reduces the error probability to 6 ,11
The bit error probability ,00 i  for the 00==>01/10 type of errors can be computed analogously to the bit error probability ,11 i  . In our case of 1   , the mean square noise level at 11 is much closer to the value at 01/10 than to the value at 00 (cf., Fig. 2 as an illustration) . Therefore, the bit error probability ,00 i  will be significantly smaller than the bit error probability ,11 i  . This situation is the opposite for the case of the voltage-based method [31] . Accordingly the experimental test of the KLJN scheme [30] used either the voltage or the current data for decision, depending of which scheme gave the smaller bit error probability.
An effective error removal method
Below we show a new error removal strategy, utilizing both voltage and current measurements without applying any error correction algorithm, which is superior to the method used in earlier work [30] .
Let us assume that Alice and Bob measure both . In an ideal error-free situation, the same bit interpretations ensue from both mean-square channel noise amplitudes. However, the bit interpretations can differ when there are errors, because the current and voltage amplitudes are statistically independent due to the Second Law of Thermodynamics (cf. Eq. 6) and the Gaussian nature of the noises (when the crosscorrelation between two Gaussian processes with zero mean is zero, the two processes are statistically independent). To eliminate errors, we select the cumulative measurement output that has the smallest error associated with it; see Fig.  5 and Table 2 . We make use of the fact that, in the bit situation when the current evaluation method has maximum error probability, the voltage-based method has minimum error probability, and vice versa. Figure 5 shows the three possible mean-square channel noise current and voltage levels. The threshold values 1  , 2  , 3  and 4  again provide the boundaries for interpreting the measured meansquare voltage and current values. The only output that is kept is when both the current and voltage bit interpretations are secure, i.e., when both are 01/10. For instance, suppose that the bit interpretation obtained from the current measurement is 00 and that the bit interpretation for the voltage measurement is 01/10. In this case, we assume 00 as the correct bit interpretation and hence discard the bit.
Error probabilities in the combined currentvoltage analysis method
The current and voltage noises are independent as a consequence of the Second Law of Thermodynamics and the Gaussianity of thermal noise, [27, 29] , and hence the probability of errors in the combined current-voltage analysis method is the product of the error probabilities of the current-based and voltagebased methods. If the duration of the bit exchange period, i.e.,  , is increased by a factor of two (meaning that the speed is decreased by the same factor), the total bit error probability 
Conclusion and final remarks
We classified and evaluated the types of errors that occur in the current-based scheme of the KLJN key exchange. These error probabilities showed an exponential dependence on the duration of the bit exchange, which is analogous to the result for the corresponding voltage-based scheme as discussed in earlier work [31] .
Furthermore, we presented an error mitigation strategy based on the combination of voltage-based and current-based schemes: only those exchanged bits are kept that are indicated to be secure by both the current and voltage methods. The resulting error probability of this combined strategy is the product of the error probabilities of the two methods, which follows from the statistical independence of the current and voltage measurements. As a consequence, the KLJN scheme can operate without error correcting algorithms, thereby preserving the independence of the exchanged bits of the secure key. Thus the key bits remain independently and identically distributed random variables, which is an important advantage for secure communication [27] .
